Intergenerational Transfers Motivated by Altruism from Children towards Parents : Dynamic Macro-economic Theory (Mathematical Economics) by Fujiu, Hiroshi
Title
Intergenerational Transfers Motivated by Altruism from
Children towards Parents : Dynamic Macro-economic Theory
(Mathematical Economics)
Author(s)Fujiu, Hiroshi




Type Departmental Bulletin Paper
Textversionpublisher
Kyoto University
Intergenerational Transfers Motivated by
Altruism from Children towards Parents
Hiroshi Fujiu*
Faculty of Economics, Chiba Keizai University,
3-59-5 Todoroki-cho, Inage-ku, Chiba 263, Japan
Abstract
This study has two ends. The first is to construct aformal model
with altruism from children towards parents and to reveal the struc-
ture of an equilibrium, which has not been studied in the existing
literature. The second is to establish the existence of an equilibrium
in this model by demonstrating the existence of adynamically consis-
tent allocation in the concept of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
KEYWORDS: intergenerational altruism; intergenerational trans-
fers; subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
JEL Classification Numbers: C62, D64, D91
. This paper is based upon part of Chapter 3of my dissertation submitted to YokO-
llan]a National University. Iwould like to thank my advisers, Professors Keiichi Koda and
Makoto Yano for their encouragement. When writing and revising the paper, Iwas espe
cially indebted to Professor Yano for his guidance. Also Iwould like to thank Professors




In the recent literature, adynamically consistent allocation is characterized
in the model with intergenerational altruism. Ray (1987) focuses on the
intergenerational altruism that one generation holds towards his descendants,
which Icall forward altruism. Hori (1997) focuses on the intergenerational
altruism that $0\dot{\mathrm{n}}\mathrm{e}$ generation holds towards both his parents and children,
which we call tw0-sided altruism. Both studies characterize dynamically
consistent paths and represent them in the form of apolicy function.
This study has two purposes. The first is to construct aformal model
with the intergenerational altruism that children hold towards parents. The
structure of an equilibrium in amodel with such altruism has not been stud-
ied in the existing literature.l This type of altruism, which Icall backward
altruism, yields two types of intergenerational transfers. One type is an in-
tergenerational transfers from children towards parents, gift. Another type is
one from parents towards children, education investments. We demonstrate
that they determine the structure of an equilibrium in this model.
The second purpose is to demonstrate the existence of adynamically con-
sistent allocation, which we call an equilibrium in this model. This concept
of equilibrium is the same as that of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in
extensive-form $\Leftrightarrow \mathrm{a}\sigma \mathrm{m}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}.2$ Ialso characterize asteady state and reveal arela-
tionship between asteady state allocation and intergenerational altruism by
using an example. By doing so, we demonstrate that the strength of inter-
generational altruism as well as its direction, also play an important role for
adynamic allocation. This finding is important for determining the policy
of an income redistribution over times or generations by a $\mathrm{g}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}.3$
In the section 2, abackward altruism model is formalized, and an equilib-
rium in this model is defined. In the section 3we demonstrate the existence
of an equilibrium. In the section 4, we make concluding remarks.
10’Connell and Zeldes (1993) also focus on an economy with altruism from children
towards parents. They interest in the behavior of transfers in this economy rather than
in the mechanism of determining an equilibrium.
$2\mathrm{A}\mathrm{s}$ for the concept of equilibrium, see Selten (1975). Leininger (1986) demonstrates
the existence of aperfect equilibrium in the economy that each generation is altruistic to
the other generations.
$3\mathrm{T}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}$ effect is discussed in Yano (1998)
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2The Model
Take atwo generation overlapping economy lasting both side of time. Each
generation is born at the end of each period and lives the sequential two
periods. Assume that each generation is altruistic towards the previous gen-
eration, which means that children are altruistic towards parents. As are-
sult, children will make gifts for parents. Assume that each generation has
an income only in the first period and has no income in the second period.
Moreover, assume that an economy has no financial asset that is available for
individuals, and that all the goods are perishable. Thus, in order to consume
in the second period, parents intend to make children have more income
that yields more gifts from children. Thus, parents make such choices, e.g.,
education investments in children.
Let generation $t$ be ageneration born at the end of period $t$ $-1$ . Note
generation $t$ lives two periods, period $t$ and period $t$ $+1$ . In period $t$ , he
obtains an income $y_{t}$ and distributes it to his own consumption $c_{t}^{1}$ , education
investments towards children (generation $t$ $+1$ ) $e_{t+1}$ , and gifts for parents
(generation $t$ $-1$ ) $g_{t}$ , which equals to parents’ consumption for their old time
$c_{t}^{2}$ ;That is gt $=c_{t}^{2}$ . In period $t+1$ , when generation $t$ is old, he makes a
consumption $c_{t+1}^{2}$ by using gifts $g_{t+1}$ received from his children. Generation
$t’ \mathrm{s}$ constraints are as follows.
$c_{t}^{1}+e_{t+1}+g_{t}=y_{t}$ , (1)
$c_{t+1}^{2}=g_{t+1}$ . (2)
Generation t is altruistic towards generation t -1 for any t. Thus, in a
model with backward altruism, autility function is expressed as follows.4
$4\mathrm{T}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}$ utility form of forward altruistic generations is expressed as
$U_{t}=u_{t}+\alpha U_{t+1}$ ,
where $u_{t}$ is generation $t’ \mathrm{s}$ utility obtained from their own consumption, and where $U_{t+1}$ is
generation $t+1’ \mathrm{s}$ total utility.
The utility form of tw0-sided altruistic generations is expressed as
$U_{t}=u_{\mathrm{t}}+\alpha U_{t+1}+\beta U_{t-1}$ .
See Hori and Kanaya (1989) and Hori (1992) for tw0-sided altruism,
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$U_{t}=v^{1}(c_{t}^{1})+v^{2}(c_{t+1}^{2})+\beta U_{t-1}$ , (3)
where $U_{t}$ and $U_{t-1}$ are total utilities of generation $t$ and of generation $t$ $-1$
respectively, and where $v^{1}(\cdot)$ and $v^{2}(\cdot)$ are utility functions for the young
time and for the old time respectively. Note that $\beta$ in (3) is adiscount factor
reflecting the degree of backward altruism, and that the higher $\beta$ is, the more
altruistic towards generation $t-1$ generation $t$ is. Assume 4is constant over
generations and satisfies $0<\beta<1$ . As for $U_{t-1}$ , the same form of utility
function as (3) can be expressed. That is, $U_{t-1}=v^{1}(c_{t-1}^{1})+v^{2}(c_{t}^{2})+\beta U_{t-2}$ .
Since generation $t$ have no effect on choices and on utility levels determined
before the end of period $t$ $-1$ in which generation $t$ is born, he considers $c_{t-1}^{1}$
and $U_{t-2}$ as given. By expressing them as $\overline{c}_{t-1}^{1}$ and $\overline{U}_{t-2}$ , we rewrite (3) into
$U_{t}=v^{1}(c_{t}^{1})+v^{2}(c_{t+1}^{2})+\beta[v^{1}(\overline{c}_{t-1}^{1})+v^{2}(c_{t}^{2})+\beta\overline{U}_{t-2}]$ . (3’)
Generation $t$ will intend to increase his utility by increasing gifts $g_{t}=c_{t}^{2}$
in the view point of children. Generation $t$ knows that he makes more gifts
towards generation $t$ $-1$ with alarger income. Thus, he may expect that
generation $t+1$ also makes more gifts towards him with alarger income.
Then, generation $t+1’ \mathrm{s}$ gift towards generation $t$ , $g_{t+1}$ , is determined by
generation $t+1’ \mathrm{s}$ income, $y_{t+1}$ . Suppose that $g_{t+1}$ is described as afunction
with respect to $y_{t+1}$ as follows.
$g_{t+1}=\Phi_{t+1}(y_{t+1})$ , (4)
where $\Phi_{t+1}(y_{t+1})$ states that generation $t$ $+1$ makes gifts $\Phi_{t+1}(y_{t+1})$ towards
his parents with his given income $y_{t+1}$ , and therefore we call it agift function
of generation $t+1$ . In the below, we write afunctional forms of generation
$t+1’ \mathrm{s}$ gift function $\Phi_{t+1}(y_{t+1})$ as $\Phi_{t+1}$ .
Generation $t$ will intend to increase his children’s income. For this pur-
pose, he will accumulate his children’s human capital by means of education
investments towards generation $t$ $+1$ . Generation $t’ \mathrm{s}$ education investments
towards his children $e_{t+1}$ accumulates his children’s human capital $h_{t+1}$ . Gen-
eration $t+1$ makes his human capital $h_{t+1}$ as an input into aproduction, and
he obtains an output $f(h_{t+1})$ , all of which become his income $y_{t+1}$ . Assume
that these relationship are as follows.
$h_{t+1}=e_{t+1}$ , $y_{t+1}=f(f\iota_{t+1})$ . (5)
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Now we are ready to describe the optimization problem of generation t.
In the optimization problem, we remove the given factors in (3’), .1 $(\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}).)$
and $U_{t-2_{\rangle}}$ on which generation t’s choices have no effect. From (1), (2), (3’),
(4), and (5), the generation t’s optimization problem is expressed as follows.
The Generation t’s Optimization Problem
$\max$ $v^{1}(c_{t}^{1})+v^{2}(\Phi_{t+1}(f(e_{t+1})))+\beta v^{2}(g_{t})$ , (6)
$(c_{t}^{1},e_{t+1},g_{t})$
s.t $c_{t}^{1}+e_{t+1}+g_{t}\leq y_{t}$ , given $y_{t}$ and $\Phi_{t+1}$ .
We will formalize an equilibrium in abackward altruism model. As
shown in (6), generation $t$ makes choices $(c_{t}^{1},e_{t+1},g_{t})$ under agiven income,
$y_{t}$ , and agiven functional form of generation $t$ $+1$ ’s gift function, $\Phi_{t+1}$ .
Since generation $t’ \mathrm{s}$ optimal choices depend on both $y_{t}$ and $\Phi_{t+1}$ , these
choices is represented as functions with respect to both $y_{t}$ and $\Phi_{t+1}$ . Let
$(c^{1}(y_{t}, \Phi_{t+1})$ , $e(y_{t}, \Phi_{t+1}),g(y_{t}, \Phi_{t+1}))$ be optimal choices $(c_{t}^{1}, e_{t+1},g_{t})$ satisfying
(6). The third term of them, $g(y_{t}, \Phi_{t+1})$ , means generation $t’ \mathrm{s}$ optimal gifts
towards parents. Each generation solves the same optimization problem as
(6). Then, generation $t-1$ regards the generation $t’ \mathrm{s}$ gift function $\Phi_{t}(y_{t})$ as
given in his optimization problem. For dynamic consistency, it must be that
$\Phi_{t}(y_{t})=g(y_{t}, \Phi_{t+1})$ , (7)
for any $y_{t}$ .
We are ready to define an equilibrium. Let $T=$ $(-\infty, \ldots,t, \ldots, +\infty)$ . We
call $\{\Phi_{t}\}_{t\in T}$ an equilibrium if $\Phi_{t}(y_{t})=g(y_{t}, \Phi_{t+1})$ for any $t$ $\in T$ . Also we call
$\{\Phi_{t}\}_{t\in T}$ astationary equilibrium if $\Phi_{t}=\Phi$ for any $t$ $\in T$ .
3Assumptions, Existence Result, and Out-
line of Proof of the Existence
Let $Y\subset R_{+}$ be aset of $y_{t}$ . Let $X^{1}\subset R_{+}$ , and $X^{2}\subset R_{+}$ . As for $f$ : $Yarrow R_{+}$
and $v^{i}$ : $X^{i}arrow R_{+}(i=1,2)$ , assume the follows.
F.I. $f$ is increasing.
F.2. There exists $\overline{y}\in Y$ such that $f(y)$ $\leq y,\forall y\in\{\tilde{y}\in Y:\tilde{y}\geq\overline{y}\}$ .
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F.3. $f(0)=0$ .
F.4. $f$ : $Yarrow R_{+}$ is continuous.
$\mathrm{V}.\mathrm{I}$ . $v^{i}$ is strictly increasing for $i=1,2$ .
V.2. $v^{i}$ is strictly concave for $i=1,2$.
V.3. $v^{i}(0)=0$ for $i=1,2$.
V.4. $v^{i}$ : $X^{i}arrow R_{+}$ is continuous for $i=1,2$ .
The main result is the following.
Theorem 1Under the assumptions (F. 1), (F.2), (F.3), (F.4), (V. 1), (V.2),
(V.3), and (V.4), there eists a stationary equilibrium.
The rest of this section provides an outline of the proof of this theorem.
Each generation’s optimization problem can be decomposed into two
parts: intratemporal optimization problem, which intergenerational alloca-
tion problem in one period in other words, and intertemporal optimization
problem. The first problem is that an available income $m\in M\subset Y$ in period
$t$ is distributed to generation $t’ \mathrm{s}$ consumption, $c_{t}^{1}$ , and gifts towards parents,
$g_{t}$ , which equals generation $t$ -l’s consumption in period $t$ , $c_{t-1}^{2}$ . Then, a
pair of optimal choices, $c_{t}^{1}$ and $g_{t}$ , is represented as $(c(m),g(m))$ that satisfies
$(c(m),g(m))= \arg\max_{c(,g)}v^{1}(c)+\beta v^{2}(g)s.t$. $c+g\leq m$ , $c\geq 0,g\geq 0$ . (8)
For the preceding proof, we define
$V(m)=v^{1}(c(m))+\beta v^{2}(g(m))$ . (9)
Then, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1 c(.) and g(.) are unique, continuous, and increasing. Moreover,
V(.) is continuous, strictly increasing, and strictly concave.
Proof. Omitted.
The second problem, i.e., an intertemporal optimization problem, is that
generation $t$ distributes his income $y_{t}$ to an available income in period $t$ ,
$m$ , and education investments towards children, $e_{t+1}$ , which leads to gift $\mathrm{s}$
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received in period $t+1$ , so as to maximize his own utility given children’s
behaviors of gifts $\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}!\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}_{*+\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}}(y_{*+\mathrm{X}})$ . We may rewrite (6) as follows.
$e_{t+1}\in[y_{t}]\mathrm{m}\mathrm{y}V(y_{t}-e_{t+1})+v^{2}(\Phi_{t+1}(f(e_{t+1})))$. (10)
Given afunction $\Phi$ : $R_{+}arrow R_{+}$ , let
$E_{\Phi}(y)= \arg\max 0\leq e\leq y\{V(y-e)+v^{2}(\Phi(f(e)))\}$ , (11)
where $E_{\Phi}(y)$ is aset of optimal choices of education investment, e, and
$\xi_{\Phi}(y)=\min\{e:e\in E_{\Phi}(y)\}$ , (12)
$(G\Phi)(\eta)=g(\eta-\xi_{\Phi}(\eta))$ , (13)
where $g(\cdot)$ is defined in (8), and
$(H \Phi)(y)=\max\{(G\Phi)(\eta)\}0\leq\eta\leq y$ . (14)
For the following lemma, call $\varphi(x)$ be upper semi-continuous if
$\lim\sup_{narrow\infty}\varphi(x_{n})\leq\varphi(x)$ as $x_{n}arrow x$ .
By the definition of equilibrium, astationary equilibrium is $\Phi$ such that
\Phi =G$. Then, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 2Take $\Phi$ satisfying that $(G\Phi)(y)$ is upper semi-continuous with
respect to $y$ , and that $\Phi=H\Phi$ . Let $\Phi^{*}(y)\equiv(G\Phi)(y)$ . Then,
$\Phi^{*}=G\Phi^{*}$ (15)
Proof- See Appendix A. $\blacksquare$
In order to show that there exists astationary equilibrium, by Lemma
2, it suffices to show that there exists $\Phi$ satisfying that $(G\Phi)(y)$ is upper
semi-continuous with respect to $y$ , and that $\Phi=H\Phi$ . Let $\tilde{y}=\max(\hat{y},\overline{y})^{5}$ ,
where $\overline{y}$ is explained in the assumption (F.2), and $Y=[0,\tilde{y}]$ . Let $C$ be aset
of $\Phi$ endowed with the topology of pointwise convergence and satisfying that
$\Phi$ is non-decreasing,
$5\mathrm{A}\mathrm{s}$ for $\overline{y}$ , refer to the assumption (F.2)
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$0\leq\Phi(y)\leq\tilde{y}$ , $\forall y\in \mathrm{Y}$, (16)
and
$\exists\ell>0$ : $|\Phi(y’)-\Phi(y’)|\leq\ell|y’-y’|$ , $\forall y’,y’\in Y$. (17)
Note that C is anonvoid convex subset of aseparated locally convex
topological vector space. First, we will demonstrate the following lemma.
Lemma 3Let $\Phi\in C$ . Then, $(G\Phi)(y)$ is upper semi-contin tous with respect
to $y$ .
Proof. See Appendix B. $\blacksquare$
Next we will demonstrate that there exists $\Phi\in C$ such that $\Phi=H\Phi$ .
Such a $\Phi$ is called to afixed point of amapping $H$ . In order to show that
there exists afixed point of amapping $H$ , we use the fixed point theorem of
Schauder-Tychonoff, which is explained by Edwards (1965).
Theorem 2(Shauder-Tychonoff theorem) Let $E$ be a separated locally
convex topological vector space, $K$ be a nonvoid compact convex subset of $E$ ,
$u$ any continuous map of $K$ into itself. Then $u$ admits at least one fixed
point.
By the definition of $C$ , $C$ is anonvoid convex subset of aseparated locally
convex topological vector space. In order to use the fixed point theorem in
this model, we require (i) that $C$ is compact, (ii) that $H$ maps $C$ into itself,
and (iii) that $H$ : $Carrow C$ is continuous.
We will demonstrate that $C$ is compact. To this end, we introduce
the mathematical concept of equicontirvuous, which is explained by Edwards
(1965), and use the following theorem.
Theorem 3(Ascoli’s theorem) Let $T$ be a topological space, $X$ be a uni-
forrn space, and $X^{T}$ be the set of all $X$ -valued functions on T. If $F\subset X^{T}$
is equicontinuous on $T$ and $F(t)$ $=\{f(t) : f\in F\}$ is relatively compact in
$X$ for each $t\in T$ , then $F$ is relatively compact in $X^{T}$ for the topology of
compact convergence.
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By this theorem, though C is endowed with the topology of pointwise
convergence, the following lemma holds.
Lemma 4 $C$ is compact for the topology of compact convergence.
Proof. See Appendix C. $\blacksquare$
We will demonstrate the rest of the requirements by the following two
lemmas.
Lemma 5Let $\Phi\in C$ . Then $H\Phi\in C$ .
Proof. See Appendix D. $\blacksquare$
Lemma 6 $H:Carrow C$ is continuous with respect to the $\sup$ norm.
Proof. See Appendix E. $\blacksquare$
Through the above lemmas, we may obtain (i) that $C$ is compact, (ii)
that $H$ maps $C$ into itself, and (iii) that $H$ : $Carrow C$ is continuous with
respect to the $\sup$ norm. By Shauder-Tychonoff theorem, there exists $\Phi\in C$
such that $\Phi=H\Phi$ . Thus, by Lemma 2, there exists 0’ such that $\Phi^{*}=G\Phi$ ”.
Therefore, it is establish that there exists astationary equilibrium.
4Concluding Remarks
This study has formalized amodel with backward altruism and demonstrated
that backward altruism, despite one-sided altruism, yields tw0-sided intergen-
erational transfers. It has also demonstrated the existence of an equilibrium
in this model.
We remain two problems. One is an absence of afinancial market, which
plays an important role on redistribution between different generations and
thus on adynamic allocation. The other is the stability of astationary
equilibrium. These problems are focused on by other papers
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Appendices
A. Proof of Lemma 2By (13), $\Phi^{*}(y)=(G\Phi)(y)=g(y-\xi_{\Phi}(y))$ and
$(G\Phi^{*})(y)=(G(G\Phi))(y)=g(y-\xi_{G\Phi}(y))$ . Thus, in order to show (15), it
suffices to show that for any $y\in Y$ ,
$\xi_{\Phi}(y)=\xi_{G\Phi}(y)$ . (18)
To this end, we first demonstrate the following two sublemmas.
Sublemma 1Let $\varphi(x)$ be upper semi-continuous (u.s.c.) with respect to $x$ .
Then, $\max_{0\leq x\leq y}\varphi(x)\equiv\pi(y)$ exists, and it is u.s.c. with respect to $y$ .
Proof. Omitted. $\blacksquare$
Sublemma 2Assume that $(G\Phi)(y)$ is upper semi-continuous (u.s.c.) with
respect to $y$ . Let $y\in Y$
$E_{G\Phi}(y)= \arg\max 0\leq e\leq y\{V(y -e)+v^{2}((G\Phi)(f(e)))\}$ ,
and
$E_{H\Phi}(y)= \arg\max_{d}0\leq e\leq y\{V(y -e)+v^{2}((H\Phi)(f(e)))\}$ .
Then, $E_{H\Phi}(y)$ and $E_{G\Phi}(y)$ are non-empty, and $E_{H\Phi}(y)\subset E_{G\Phi}(y)$ .
Proof. Omitted. ii
In order to show (18), since $\Phi=.H\Phi$ , it suffices to show that $\xi_{H\Phi}(y)$ $=$
$\xi_{G\Phi}(y)$ . By Sublemma 2, $\xi_{H\Phi}(y)\in E_{G\Phi}(y)$ . Thus, it must.hold that $\xi_{H\Phi}(y)$ $\geq$
$\xi_{G\Phi}(y)$ . Suppose $\xi_{H\Phi}(y)$ $>\xi_{G\Phi}(y)$ . Let $e^{h}=\xi_{H\Phi}(y)$ and $e^{g}=\xi_{G\Phi}(y)$ . Then,
since $e^{g}\not\in E_{H\Phi}(y)$ ,
$V(y-e^{g})+v^{2}((H\Phi)(f(e^{\mathit{9}})))<V(y -e^{h})+v^{2}((H\Phi)(f(e^{h})))$ . (19)
By (14), $(H\Phi)(f(e^{g}))\geq(G\Phi)(f(e^{g}))$ . By Sublemma 2, $(H\Phi)(f(e^{h}))=$
$(G\Phi)(f(e^{h}))$ . Moreover, since $e^{h}$ , $e^{g}\in E_{G\Phi}(y)$ ,
$V(y-e^{g})+v^{2}((G\Phi)(f(e^{g})))=V(y -e^{h})+v^{2}((G\Phi)(f(e^{h})))$ .
Then since $v^{2}$ is strictly increasing, it follows that
$V(y -e^{g})+v^{2}((H\Phi)(f(e^{g})))\geq V(y -e^{h})+v^{2}((H\Phi)(f(e^{h})))$ ,
$\mathrm{w}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{h}$ , however, contradicts (19). Therefore, $\xi_{H\Phi}(y)$ $=\xi_{G\Phi}(y)$ .
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B. Proof of Lemma 3For this proof, since $(G\Phi)(y)=g(y -\xi_{\Phi}(y))$ by
(13), we will show $g(y-\xi_{\Phi}(y))$ is upper semi-continuous (u.s.c.) with respect
to $y$ . To this end, since $g(\cdot)$ is continuous, it suffices to show that $\xi_{\Phi}(y)$ is
lower semi-continuous (l.s.c.) with respect to $y$ ;That is,
$\lim_{arrow}.\cdot\sup_{\infty}\xi_{\Phi}(y_{\dot{1}})\geq\xi_{\Phi}(y)$ as $y_{i}arrow y$ . (20)
We first show the following sublemma.
Sublemma 3(i) $\xi_{\Phi}(y)$ exists, and (ii) $\Phi\in C$ , $y’>y’$ , $e’\in E_{\Phi}(y’)$ , and
$e’\in E_{\Phi}(y^{JJ})$ imply $e’\geq e’$ .
Proof. Omitted. $\blacksquare$
Take asequence $\{y_{i}\}$ such that $y\dot{.}arrow y$ . Let $\{y_{j}.\cdot\}$ be adeceasing sequence
of $\{y_{i}\}$ . Then, from Sublemma 3, it follows that $\lim\sup\xi_{\Phi}(y\dot{.}j)\geq\xi_{\Phi}(y)$ .
$jarrow\infty$
Take an increasing sequence $\{y_{j}\dot{.}\}$ of $\{y_{i}\}$ . Since $\xi_{\Phi}(y)$ is non-dec easing,
$y_{i}\leq y$ implies $\xi_{\Phi}(y\dot{.})\leq\xi_{\Phi}(y)$ for any $i$ . Since $\xi_{\Phi}(y)$ exists for any $y$ $\in Y$ ,
we may take $\lim_{:arrow\infty}\xi_{\Phi}(y\dot{.})$ . Then, it must hold that $\lim_{:arrow\infty}\xi_{\Phi}(y\dot{.})\leq\xi_{\Phi}(y)$ .
Suppose that $\lim_{:arrow\infty}\xi_{\Phi}(y\dot{.})<\xi_{\Phi}(y)$ . Let $e^{*}= \lim:arrow\infty\xi_{\Phi}(y:)$ . Since $\xi_{\Phi}(y)$ is
optimal, and since $e^{*}$ is not optimal,
$[V(y -\xi_{\Phi}(y))+v^{2}(\Phi(f(\xi_{\Phi}(y))))]-[V(y-e^{*})+v^{2}(\Phi(f(e^{*})))]\equiv\epsilon>0$ .
(21)
Since $y_{i}arrow y$ and $\xi_{\Phi}(y_{i})arrow e^{*}$ , for any $\epsilon>0$ , there exists $i_{1}$ such that $\forall i\geq i_{1}$ ,
$V(y -e^{*})+v^{2}( \Phi(f(e^{*})))+\frac{\epsilon}{2}>V(y_{i}-\xi_{\Phi}(y_{i}))+v^{2}(\Phi(f(\xi_{\Phi}(y_{i}))))$ . (22)
Take asequence $\{e_{i}\}$ such that q. $\equiv\max\{y_{i}-y +\xi_{\Phi}(y),$0}. Then, for
any $\epsilon>0$ , there exists $i_{2}$ such that $\forall i\geq i_{2}$ , $e_{i}\geq 0$ and
$V(y \dot{.}-e:)+v^{2}(\Phi(f(e_{i})))>V(y-\xi_{\Phi}(y))+v^{2}(\Phi(f(\xi_{\Phi}(y))))-\frac{\epsilon}{2}$. (23)
From (21), (22), and (23), it follows that
$V(y_{i}-e:)+v^{2}(\Phi(f(e:)))>V(y.\cdot-\xi_{\Phi}(y_{i}))+v^{2}(\Phi(f(\xi_{\Phi}(y_{i}))))$ ,
which, however, contradicts the definition of $\xi_{\Phi}(y_{i})$ . Therefore, $\lim_{iarrow\infty}\xi_{\Phi}(y_{i})--$
$\xi_{\Phi}(y)$ .
From the above argument, we may obtain that (20) holds for any $\{y_{i}\}$
such that $y_{i}arrow y$ . $\blacksquare$
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C. Proof of Lemma 4Since $Y=[0,\tilde{y}]$ is ametric space, it is atopological
space. $R$ is auniform space. Let $R^{\mathrm{Y}}$ be the set of all real valued functions
on $Y$ . By the definition of $C$ , $C$ is anonvoid convex subset of $R^{\mathrm{Y}}$ endowed
with the topology of pointwise convergence and satisfying the following two
conditions. The first is that
$\exists\ell>0$ : $\forall y’,y’\in Y$, $\forall\Phi\in C$ , $|\Phi(y’)-\Phi(y’)|<\ell|y’-y’|$ ,
from which it follows that, for any $\epsilon>0$ , there exists $\delta$ $=\epsilon/\ell>0$ satisfy-
ing that, for any pair $(y’, \oint’)$ such that $| \oint$ $- \oint’|<\delta$ , and for any $\Phi\in C$ ,
$|\Phi(y’)-\Phi(y’)|<\epsilon$ . Thus, the first condition means that $C$ is equicontinuous
on $Y$ . The second condition is that
$\exists M>0$ : $\forall y\in Y$, $\forall\Phi\in C$ , $0\leq\Phi(y)\leq M$ ,
from which it follows that $C(y)=\{\Phi(y):\Phi\in C\}$ is (relatively) sequential
compact, with respect to the same topology as $R$ , for each $y\in Y$ since $C$
is endowed with the topology of pointwise convergence. Then, by Ascoli’s
theorem, $C$ is relatively compact in $R^{Y}$ for the topology of compact conver-
gence.
D. Proof of Lemma 5Let $\Phi\in C$ , which means that $\Phi(y)$ is non-
decreasing with respect to $y$ and satisfies (16) and (17). Since $(G\Phi)(y)$ is
upper semi-continuous, by Sublemma 1, $(H\Phi)(y)$ exists. By (14), we may
obtain that $(H\Phi)(y)$ is non-deceasing with respect to $y$ . Thus, in order to
show $H\Phi\in C$ , it suffices to show that $H\Phi$ satisfies
$0\leq(H\Phi)(y)\leq\tilde{y}$ , $\forall y\in Y$ , (24)
and
$\exists\ell>0$ : $|(H\Phi)(y’)-(H\Phi)(y’)|\leq\ell|y’-y’|$ , $\forall y’$ , $y’\in Y$ . (25)
First, we will show (24). Let $y$ $\in Y$ . Since $(H\Phi)(y)=\mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}_{-}\mathrm{x}_{0\leq \mathrm{x}\leq y}(G\Phi)(x)$ ,
and since (GO) $(x)=g(x-\xi_{\Phi}(x))\leq x$ , it follows that $(H \Phi)(y)=\max 0\leq x\leq y$
$g(x-\xi_{\Phi}(x))\leq y$ . Since $\tilde{y}\equiv\max\{y :y \in Y\}$ , $(H\Phi)(y)\leq\tilde{y}$ . By the-definition
of $g(\cdot)$ , $(H\Phi)(y)\geq 0$ . Therefore, (24) holds.
Next, we will show (25). Assume $y’\geq y’$ without loss of generality. If
$y’=y’$ , then (25) holds. Let $\nu$ $>y’$ . If $(H \Phi)(\oint)=(H\Phi)(y’)$ , then (25)
holds. Note that (H$)(y) is non-decreasing with respect to $y$ . Thus, we will
demonstrate that $y’>y’$ and $(H\Phi)(y’)>(H\Phi)(y’)$ imply (25). To this end,
we first demonstrate the following sublemma
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Sublemma 4 $\xi_{\Phi}(y)$ is non-decreasing with respect to y.
Proof. Omitted. $\blacksquare$
Let $\nu$ $>y’$ and $(H\Phi)(y’)>(H\Phi)(y’)$ . Take $\nu$\prime\prime be such that $(H\Phi)(y’)=$
$(G\Phi)(y’)$ and $\nu$ $\geq y’>y’$ . Then, since $(H\Phi)(y’)\geq(G\Phi)(y^{JJ})$ , it follows
that $(G\Phi)(y’)>(G\Phi)(y’)$ , which means $\tilde{g}(y^{m}-\xi_{\Phi}(y^{\prime\mu}))>g(y’-\xi_{\Phi}(y’))$ by
(13). Since $g$ is non-decreasing, $y’- \xi_{\Phi}(\oint’)>y’-\xi_{\Phi}(y’)$ . Since $c$ is non-
decreasing, $c( \oint’-\xi_{\Phi}(\oint’))-c(\oint’-\xi_{\Phi}(y’))\geq 0$. Since $\xi_{\Phi}(y)$ is non-decreasing




Then, by the budget constraint of (1), we may obtain that $g(y’-\xi_{\Phi}(y’))-$
$g(y’- \xi_{\Phi}(\oint’))\leq\psi’-\oint’$ ;That is,
$(G\Phi)(y’)-(G\Phi)(y’)\leq y’-y’’$ .
Therefore, since $(H \Phi)(y’)=(G\Phi)(\oint’)$ , and since $y’\geq\nu\prime\prime>y’$ ,
$0<(H\Phi)(y’)-(H\Phi)(y^{n})\leq y’-y^{J}$
From the above argument, (25) is established.
E. Proof of Lemma 6Take asequence $\{\Phi^{n}\}$ satisfying that $\Phi^{n}\in C$ , and
that there exists $\Phi\in C$ such that $\lim_{narrow\infty}||\Phi^{n}-\Phi||=0$ where $||\cdot||$ is the $\sup$
norm. Note $\Phi\in C$ implies $H\Phi\in C$ by Lemma 5. Then, in order to show
that $H:Carrow C$ is $||\cdot||$ -continuous, it suffices to show
$\lim_{narrow\infty}||H\Phi^{n}-H\Phi||=0$ . (26)
Let $y^{n} \in\arg\sup_{y\in Y}|(H\Phi^{n})(y)-(H\Phi)(y)|$ . Since $Y$ is compact, asequence
$\{y^{n}\}$ has aconvergent subsequence. Let $y$ be the limit of this subsequence;




Since $H+6$ C, it follows from (17) that $|(H^{\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}}>^{\mathrm{n}})(\mathrm{x})-(H^{\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}}!\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}^{*})(y\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}|\mathrm{t}\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$ -y|,
and that $|(H+)(\mathrm{y})-(H+)(\mathrm{t}\mathrm{y}^{\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}}\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}|\mathrm{y}$ -fI. Thus, in order to show that
$|(H^{\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}}>^{\mathrm{n}})(\mathrm{x})-(H+)(\mathrm{y}\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$ 0 as $\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT} j/"\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$ y, it suffices to show that
$|(H\Phi^{n})(y)-(H\Phi)(y)|arrow 0$ as $y^{n}arrow y$ . (27)
To this end, we will demonstrates the following sublemma.
Sublemma 5Let $\Phi^{n}$ , $())\in C$ , $\eta^{\mathrm{n}}$ ,y7 $\in Y$ for any $n$ . Assume $\Phi^{n}arrow\Phi$ and
$\eta^{n}arrow\eta$ . Then, $\lim_{narrow\infty}\xi_{\Phi^{n}}(\eta^{n})\in E_{\Phi}(\eta)$ . Moreover, if $\eta$ be acontinuity
point of $\xi_{\Phi}(\eta)$ , then $\lim_{narrow\infty}\xi_{\Phi^{n}}(\eta^{n})=\xi_{\Phi}(\eta)$ .
Proof. Omitted. $\blacksquare$
We will demonstrate (27), which means (a) that $\lim_{narrow\infty}(H\Phi^{n})(y)\leq$
(H$)(y), and (b) that $\lim_{narrow\infty}(H\Phi^{n})(y)\geq(H\Phi)(y)$ . First, we will demon-
strate (a). Take $\{\eta^{n}\}_{n=1}^{\infty}$ be such that $0\leq\eta^{n}\leq y$ and $\lim_{narrow\infty}\eta^{n}=\eta$ . Since
$\lim_{narrow\infty}\xi_{\Phi^{n}}(\eta^{n})\in E_{\Phi}(\eta)$ by Sublemma 5, and since $\xi_{\Phi}(\eta)$ is minimum in
$E_{\Phi}(\eta)$ by the definition of $\xi_{\Phi}(\eta)$ in (12), it follows that $\lim_{narrow\infty}\xi_{\Phi^{n}}(\eta^{n})\geq$
$\xi_{\Phi}(\eta)$ . Take $\{\eta^{n}\}_{n=1}^{\infty}$ be such that $0\leq\eta^{n}\leq y$ and $(H\Phi^{n})(y)$ $=(G\Phi^{n})(\eta^{n})$ .
Note $(G\Phi^{n})(\eta^{n})=g(\eta^{n}-\xi_{\Phi^{\tau\iota}}(\eta^{n}))$ by (13). Then,
$\lim_{narrow\infty}g(\eta^{n}-\xi_{\Phi^{n}}(\eta^{n}))\leq g(\eta-\xi_{\Phi}(\eta))$.
Since (G$) (y) $=g(\eta-\xi_{\Phi}(\eta))$ , we may obtain (a) $\lim_{narrow\infty}(H\Phi^{n})(y)\leq(H\Phi)(y)$ .
Next, we will prove (b). Let $\eta^{*}$ be such that $0<\eta^{*}\leq y$ and
$(H\Phi)(y)=(G\Phi)(\eta^{*})$ . (28)
Since $\xi_{\Phi}(y)$ is lower semi-continuous as shown in Lemma 3, and since $\xi_{\Phi}(y)$ is
non-decreasing by Sublemma 4, it follows that $\xi_{\Phi}(y)$ is continuous from the
left with respect to $y$ . Then, since $g$ is continuous, $(G\Phi)(y)=g(y -\xi_{\Phi}(y))$
is also continuous from the left with respect to $y$ . Thus, for any $\epsilon$ $>0$ , we
may take acontinuity point $\eta$ of $\xi_{\Phi}(\cdot)$ such that $0\leq\eta<\eta^{*}$ and
(GO) $(\eta)>(G\Phi)(\eta^{*})-\epsilon$ . (29)
Let $\{\eta^{n}\}_{n=1}^{\infty}$ be asequence such that $0\leq\eta^{n}\leq y$ and $\eta^{n}arrow\eta$ . Then, since $\eta$
is acontinuity point of $\xi_{\Phi}(\cdot)$ , $\lim_{narrow\infty}\xi_{\Phi^{n}}(\eta^{n})=\xi_{\Phi}(\eta)$ by Sublemma 5. Then,
since $g$ is continuous, $\lim_{narrow\infty}g(\eta^{n}-\xi_{\Phi^{\tau\iota}}(\eta^{n}))=g(\eta-\xi_{\Phi}(\eta))$;That is,
$\lim_{narrow\infty}(G\Phi^{n})(\eta^{n})=(G\Phi)(\eta)$ . (30)
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Since 0 $\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$ t7” $\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$ y, since $(H+)(y)$ is non-decreasing in y, and since it must
hold that (HO)(y) $\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$ $(G^{\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}}!\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT})(y)$ ,
$(H\Phi^{n})(y)\geq(H\Phi^{n})(\eta^{n})\geq(G\Phi^{n})(\eta^{n})$ (31)
Then, from (30) and (31), it follows that
$n.arrow\infty \mathrm{h}\mathrm{m}(H\Phi^{n})(y)\geq(G\Phi)(\eta)$ . (32)
In (29), $\epsilon$ is arbitrary. Then, by (28), (29), and (32), we may obtain (b)
$\lim_{narrow\infty}(H\Phi^{n})(y)\geq(H\Phi)(y)$ . Thus, (27) is established. Therefore, we may
obtain (26); That is, $H$ is $||\cdot||$ -continuous.
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